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In recent years, federal-state relations have often been strained when
dealing with the protection of consumer interests. State officials have, for
example, investigated corporate abuses that federal officials had failed to
examine, in turn prompting federal action.' State legislatures have enacted
legislation aimed at protecting consumers against corporate abuses, such as
predatory lending, which is more extensive than federal legislation,
prompting federal guidelines on abusive lending practices.2 In these cases,
the actions of state officials have been both praised and criticized-praised
by advocates for strong consumer protection, and criticized by industry
members and, often, by federal officials.3 Some federal officials, such as
* Professor of Law, Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center, St. John's University.
1. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Vows to Act on Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2003, at Cl (describing the S.E.C.'s intention to overhaul regulation of the mutual fund
industry due to the embarrassment caused by swift state action); Gretchen Morgenson,
Accord Highlights Wall St. Failures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at CI (highlighting how
regulators at the S.E.C., New York Stock Exchange, and NASD failed to police the
brokerage firms and protect investors during the 1990s stock surge, forcing New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to bring the issue to light).
2. See Donald C. Lampe, Federal Preemption and the Future of Mortgage Loan
Regulation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1207 (2004) (discussing federal preemption of predatory
lending); Donald C. Lampe, Update on Federal Preemption and State Mortgage Lending
Laws, 60 Bus. LAW. 703 (2005) (providing an update on federal preemption of predatory
lending).
3. See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas, Firm Sues to Block Mutual Fund Fee Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2005, at C8 (discussing the efforts of J. & W. Seligman & Company to block
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's inquiry into its fees practices); see also Statement by
Acting Comptroller Julie L. Williams in Response to Comments by Eliot Spitzer, May 19,
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the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, have responded by issuing
regulations broadly preempting states laws.4 In addition, the Comptroller
of the Currency has aggressively asserted its authority to preempt state law
by bringing suit against state officials, such as its suit against New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to stop the State from collecting information
from national banks to assess possible violations of state and federal fair
lending laws.' This is part of a broader pattern of attempts by federal
officials to set aside state protections for consumers through broad
preemption of state law.6
This Article explores federal regulatory preemption of state law
accomplished through agency nonacquiescence. It presents a case study of
nonacquiescence that is one of the most extreme examples of executive
assertion of power. It is a study of nonacquiescence to the evolution of
legal doctrine recognized by the United States Supreme Court and
uniformly recognized by the circuit courts. It is also a study of
nonacquiescence to clear statements of Congressional intent. Such agency
action is troubling due to its possible negative impact on efforts to protect
the interests of consumers on the part of state governments. It is also
troubling because of the absence of any effective check on federal agency
assertions of power. This is due to the deference most courts grant to
agency preemption decisions.
Part II of this Article examines the issue of judicial deference toward
federal agency decisions to preempt state law. The law remains unsettled
on the issue of whether the judiciary should grant Chevron deference to
agency preemption decisions.7 The United States Supreme Court has not
clearly resolved the issue. The Court had an opportunity to settle this
question in its last term, but again failed to do so.8 The decisions in the
circuit courts are divided. However, the circuit courts generally defer to
2005, http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2005-52a.pdf (arguing that if Attorney General
Spitzer is suggesting to undertake duplicative work in connection with institutions currently
under OCC review for possible violations of fair lending laws, this would potentially disrupt
and certainly impede the OCC's ability to promptly and efficiently conduct its exam work).
4. See discussion infra note 49 and accompanying text.
5. Michele Heller, For Spitzer, A Tactical Shift in Fight Against OCC, AM. BANKR.,
Aug. 9, 2005, at 1 (describing a suit brought against Eliot Spitzer by the OCC and the
Clearing House Association, which represents several large banks including Citigroup,
HSBC, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo).
6. Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption By Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227 (2007) (discussing the actions of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
and Food and Drug Administration).
7. See infra notes 23, and 26-27.
8. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007) (evading the question of
whether Chevron deference should apply by finding that the National Bank Act itself-
independent of OCC's regulation-preempts state law).
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agency decisions to preempt state law in the absence of a clear statutory
directive. This leads to cursory judicial review and, as documented in this
Article, little likelihood that an agency decision will be disturbed. As a
result of such cursory review, the courts have sustained federal regulatory
actions that have set aside, directly or by implication, state efforts to protect
consumers, including state legislation and/or enforcement efforts involving:
predatory lending, 9 fair lending laws,' ° antifraud statues," and other
consumer protection measures, such as limits on fees for bank services.1
2
Part III of this Article examines the ramifications of judicial deference
to agency preemption decisions. If federal agencies exercise self-restraint,
then substantial judicial oversight might be unnecessary. However,
restraint cannot be reasonably expected when agencies face conflicts of
interest-i.e. when they have an interest in setting aside state laws or
protecting the interests of the industry over the interests of the general
public. Part III presents a case study of lack of agency restraint due to
conflicts of interest by examining the actions of the Comptroller of the
Currency over the 1992-2006 period.
Part IV of this Article presents an alternative to judicial deference to
preemption decisions. In the past, the alternatives suggested by the courts
have been all or nothing-either no deference to any agency preemption
decision or deference in all cases. This Article formulates another
alternative-heightened judicial review triggered by evidence of agency
bias.
II. THE EXISTING DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Preemption of state law by regulatory agencies presents a clash of
principles-a clash between the supremacy of federal law 3 and principles
9. Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
Maryland's prohibition on prepayment penalties as preempted); Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker,
411 F.3d 1289 (1 1th Cir. 2005) reh'g granted, vacated en banc, 433 F.3d 1334 (1 1th Cir.
2005), vacated, appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (preempting
Georgia statute outlawing "payday" loan stores, which make loans with interest rates
averaging 400-500%).
10. Office of the Comptroller of Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (holding that New York State Attorney General had no power to examine financial
records of national banks to determine compliance with fair lending laws).
11. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 2007) (preempting state antifraud
statutes regulating sale of "gift cards" by national banks).
12. Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., NA v. James, 321 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2003) (preempting
Texas par value statutes prohibiting national banks from charging a check cashing fee);
Bank of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco., 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding city
ordinances prohibiting ATM fees charged to non-bank customers preempted).
13. Courts have repeatedly noted that preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001);
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of federalism. 4  Given this clash of two important Constitutional
principles, the role of the courts in resolving this issue becomes of
paramount concern. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has
not settled whether courts should defer to agency decisions to preempt state
law.
Early decisions of the Court endorsed a deferential standard of review
of agency regulations and decisions preempting state law."s  These
decisions deferred to agency determinations in a specific context, namely
when the agency was applying a statutorily delegated power to preempt a
specific state law. A very different context would be a case raising an issue
of whether there is power to preempt under a relevant federal statute. Such
a case raises a question of agency power, namely whether a federal statute
permits preemption at all. The case law has consistently noted that a court
must independently determine whether an agency has acted within the
scope of its statutory authority. 16 It can be said that this is an issue of law
that the courts have the expertise to determine without the need to defer to
agency determination. However, the issue is not that simple. In claims of
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); City of New York v.
F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988); La Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
14. Federalism concerns are recognized in the presumption that the historic powers of
the states, such as police powers or regulation of health and safety, are not to be superseded
by federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. See Lorillard
Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 541-42 (applying "the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress" to the analysis of whether the FCLAA preempts
Massachusetts' Attorney General's cigarette advertising regulations) (internal citation
omitted); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("Consideration of
issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1985) (holding that the county's health ordinances
are not preempted by federal regulation and do not endanger federal goals).
15. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961) (explaining that where
Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties requiring the exercise of
judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether it involve questions of law or fact, will
not be reviewed by the courts unless he has exceeded his authority or his action was clearly
wrong); see also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982).
16. See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (the
Court, in 2002, again reviewed an agency decision to preempt state law without referring to
Chevron. Again, the court decided whether the agency had statutory authority to adopt the
preemptive order in question. The Court of Appeals decision that the Court reviewed had
deferred to the agency's determination); Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 159
(ruling that Congress delegated sufficient authority to the Board to issue its preemptive
regulation); City of N.Y., 486 U.S. at 64 (describing how the focus is on the proper bounds
of an agency's lawful authority to displace state law); La. Pub. Serv. Comm"n, 476 U.S. 355
(the Court, in 1986, reviewed de novo an agency decision to preempt state law, without
citing or discussing the deferential standard of review discussed in Chevron or in the earlier
Shimer decision).
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implied preemption due to alleged conflict between federal and state law,
the governing standard to decide the preemption question is an issue of law.
However, the degree of conflict between federal and state law and the
ability to harmonize federal and state requirements are not issues of law.
They are questions in which agencies can claim expertise. Nonetheless, the
public policy question is presented, namely whether an executive agency
should effectively determine the bounds of federal versus state authority or
whether this is a decision that should be left to the courts.
The rationale for a deferential standard of review has been the superior
expertise of agency officials. As the Court explained in United States v.
Shimer:
More than a half-century ago this Court declared that "where
Congress has committed to the head of a department certain
duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his
action thereon, whether it involve questions of law or fact, will
not be reviewed by the courts unless he has exceeded his
authority or this court should be of opinion that his action was
clearly wrong." This admonition has been consistently followed
by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a
statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.17
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court cast doubt on the
conclusion that preemption determinations are subject to a deferential
standard of judicial review when they involve agency exercise of power
and do not raise issues of the agency's authorization to preempt at all. In
Smiley v. Citibank,8 the claim was made that judicial deference is
inappropriate whenever a federal agency decides to preempt state law. The
justification for this claim was principles of federalism-the need to
preserve traditional areas of state law manifest in a presumption against
preemption recognized in the Cipollone decision.' 9 In Smiley v. Citibank,°
the court noted:
[P]etitioner contends that no Comptroller interpretation of § 85 is
entitled to deference, because § 85 is a provision that pre-empts
state law. She argues that the "presumption against . . . pre-
emption" announced in Cipollone v. Liggett Croup, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 518, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), in
effect trumps Chevron, and requires a court to make its own
17. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 381-82 (citations omitted).
18. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996).
19. See Cippollone v. Ligett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
20. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 743-44.
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interpretation of § 85 that will avoid (to the extent possible)
preemption of state law. This argument confuses the question of
the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of a statute
with the question of whether a statute is pre-emptive. We may
assume (without deciding) that the latter question must always be
decided de novo by the courts. That is not the question at issue
here; there is not doubt that § 85 pre-empts state law.2'
The statute in Smiley explicitly preempted state law with respect to the
"interest" national banks may charge on loans made in states other than the
state in which they are chartered.2 2 The agency interpretation at issue was
of the meaning of the term "interest" contained in the statute. Therefore,
the Court applied a deferential standard of review to that determination.
The Court's statement regarding de novo review became dicta.
However, the agency interpretations in the case study in Part III and
the circuit court decisions discussed below rely on general grants of
power-e.g. the power to receive deposits or to make loans-and not on
explicit statutory provisions preempting state law in the context presented.
The issue is whether such statutes implicitly preempt state law at all, and if
so, to what extent. The language in the Smiley decision suggests that such
agency decisions are subject to de novo review, but the Court did not settle
the issue.
When faced with the issue of the proper standard of review for agency
preemption decisions, the holdings of most circuit courts, such as the
Second Circuit's holding in the Wachovia Bank decision, 23 apply a
deferential standard of review. They have either applied the principles laid
down in the Chevron case,14 or a similar rule of deference that gives great
weight to any reasonable agency construction of a statute.25
However, some circuit courts have refused to defer to agency
decisions to preempt state law.2 6  Finally, some courts have avoided
2 1. Id. at 743-44.
22. Id. at 737.
23. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314-15 (2d Cir. 2005).
24. See Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Tumbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2006);
Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v.
Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); Burke, 414 F.3d at 314-15; Wells Fargo Bank of
Tex. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Auer v. Robbins, which in turn
applied the Chevron standard of deference); Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 997 (1 1th Cir.
1996); Time Warner Cable v. Doyle, 66 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 1995); Okla. Natural Gas
Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 28 F.3d 1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But see
contrary decisions of Eleventh Circuit panel, infra note 26; and uncertainty expressed by
other panels in the Seventh and D.C. Circuit, infra note 27.
25. See Bank One, Utah v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844, 849 (8th Cir. 1999) (arguing that the
Comptroller's interpretation of the National Bank Act is entitled to great weight).
26. See Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1301 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (arguing that a
preemption determination is a matter more within the expertise of the courts than within the
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resolving the issue, noting it is one that the Supreme Court case law has left
unresolved.27
The uncertainty in this area is exemplified by the conflicting opinions
of the Eleventh Circuit. In 1996, the court, in Teper v. Miller 8, reasoned
that agency determinations, including interpretations that address the scope
of preemption of state law, are entitled to deference under the Chevron
principle. This deference is due to agency expertise in making policy
determinations and reconciling conflicting policies.29 However, in 2005,
another Eleventh Circuit panel ruled no deference was due to an agency
determination to preempt state law. It rejected claims of agency expertise
without citing Teper or discussing the earlier ruling accepting claims of
agency expertise. Instead, the court concluded that preemption
determinations involve matters more within the expertise of the courts than
within the expertise of an administrative agency.3 °
The difference of opinion in the Court of Appeals decisions has
centered on the expertise of federal executive agencies. However, this is
not the only relevant consideration. Federalism is an important concern as
well.3 In deciding how to resolve the issue of the proper role of the
executive branch in the tension between supremacy of federal law and
preservation and recognition of state law and interests, it is important to
recognize an implicit basis of the United States Supreme Court's decisions
to defer to agency determinations. Chevron did not speak only of agency
expertise. It spoke of a forum for resolving conflicting policies and the
expertise of an administrative agency) reh 'g granted, vacated en banc, 433 F.3d 1344 (11 th
Cir. 2005), vacated, appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11 th Cir. 2006); Colo. Pub.
Util. Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that the Department
of Transportation's expertise "lies in determining the scope and coverage of its regulations
and whether Colorado's regulations cover the same subject matter. However, a preemption
determination involves matters of law-an area more within the expertise of the courts than
within the expertise of the Secretary of Transportation").
27. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Vega, 174 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
there is uncertainty as to whether it is appropriate to defer to an agency that is seeking to
expand federal power at the expense of the states through a generous construal of
preemption clause); Mass. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
("Neither the Supreme Court nor this one has ever definitively decided whether an agency's
determination that an explicit preemption provision in a statute it administers blocks some
state action is reviewed according to Chevron. We thus assume, without deciding, that the
principles of Chevron encompass an agency's interpretation..
28. Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 997 (11 th Cir. 1996).
29. Id. at 997-98.
30. Bankwest, Inc., 411 F.3d at 1300-01.
31. This concern is seen in case law recognizing the importance of avoiding preemption
of traditional areas of state regulation. Most recently this federalism concern was the basis
of the United States Supreme Court's decision not to preempt state common law causes of
action in Bates v. Dow AgroSciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
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accountability of the chosen forum.32 The assumption was that the
executive agency would provide a voice for all the conflicting interests and
an unbiased forum for settling the conflicting interests. The case study in
Part III tests this assumption, and questions whether deference is
appropriate when the agency's actions demonstrate it is not acting as an
unbiased forum.
How should the courts respond to cases of agency bias and agency
self-interest? Differing views on the issue of agency bias are epitomized
by the contrasting viewpoints of Cass Sunstein3 and Richard Pierce.34
Sunstein recognized the likelihood of agency bias and self-dealing on
jurisdictional issues and opined that independent judicial assessments
would be appropriate.35 Pierce, on the other hand, opined that a federal
agency is likely to exercise considerable self-restraint in preempting state
law and therefore agency bias does not pose a serious threat to values of
federalism. 36  Neither Sunstein nor Pierce presented or reviewed the
evidence of possible agency bias or, in Pierce's case, the evidence of any
agency self-restraint.37 That is the evidence explored in Part III through a
case study of agency preemption decisions by federal bank regulatory
agencies.
III. A STUDY OF AGENCY BIAS
The case study in this Article involves the decisions by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regarding the preemption of state
law. It begins with an analysis of the OCC's 2004 regulations preempting
a broad range of state laws. It then examines the other OCC preemption
32. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
33. See Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071 (1990).
34. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and
Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607
(1985).
35. Sunstein, supra, note 33 at 2101. See also Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92
VA. L. REV. 187, 210 (2006) (providing a later discussion of the same issue).
36. Pierce, supra, note 34 at 665 (cautioning, however, that courts should exercise
heightened vigilance in reviewing agency preemptive rules to ensure affected states have the
opportunity to be heard, the rule is no broader than necessary, and that there is substantial
evidence for the conclusion that state regulations have the potential to create substantial
disproportionate interstate spillovers).
37. Arthur Wilmarth's analysis of the OCC's 2004 preemption regulations provides
evidence of lack of agency self-restraint. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption
Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking
System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FINAN. L. 225 (2004).
Wilmarth's article examines a larger group of agency decisions-i.e. all OCC and FDIC
decisions and regulations preempting state law in the 1996-2006 period-to analyze the
effect of agency bias.
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decisions since the early 1990's. Finally, it compares the OCC approach to
the preemption issue to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
(FDIC) decisions, on reconciling state and federal laws affecting consumer
protection concerns during the same time span.
Overall, the findings are that in the last two decades the OCC has not
acted as a neutral forum to resolve conflicting policies. Rather it has acted
as an advocate for the interests of national banks and therefore an advocate
for the broadest possible preemption of state law. The OCC's advocacy
stance has led it to (a) ignore evolution of legal doctrine found in the
United States Supreme Court case law, and (b) ignore legislative history
when it contradicts the OCC's conclusions on the preemptive effect of
federal law.
Agency nonacquiescence has been a subject of commentary for many
years, with commentators documenting nonacqienscence in the decisions of
one or more circuit courts by various federal agencies."s In recent years
many commentators and most judges have taken the view that agency
nonacquiescence is not justified, especially in cases of intracircuit
nonacquiescence, namely when review will be to a particular court and the
agency refuses to follow the case law of that court. 3 9 Even advocates of a
contrary viewpoint, such as Estreicher and Revesz, have defended that
viewpoint only when the law remains in flux. 40  Thus, the present case
38. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 692-718 (1989) (examining the actions of the
Social Security Administration , National Labor Relations Board, Internal Revenue Service
and other federal agencies); James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's
Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221 (2005) (noting the National Labor
Relations Board decisions to ignore precedent); Rebecca Hanner White, Time for a New
Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of the Circuit" when Confronting
Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639 (1991)
(suggesting the National Labor Relations Board's nonacquiescense policy is proper and
lawful); Douglas M. Branson, SEC Nonacquiescence in Judicial Decision Making: Target
Company Disclosure of Acquisition Negotiations, 46 MD. L. REV. 1001 (1987) (recognizing
Securities and Exchange Commission statement that the U.S. Court of Appeals is wrong);
Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils
of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REv. 471 (1986) (discussing the actions of the Social Security
Administration, National Labor Relations Board, Internal Revenue Service, and
Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission).
39. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions As Binding Law and As Explanations for
Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 49-50 (1993) (recognizing a changing trend where
legal academia now thinks judicial opinions should be binding even on those not involved in
the case). Professor Merrill, however, presents arguments to the contrary. See Matthew
Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of
Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990) (nonacquiescence
renders the judicial system powerless). For a discussion of categories of nonacquiescence,
see Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 38, at 687.
40. "[A] court of appeals is expected to be open to reconsidering prior rulings in the
light of developments in other circuits .... This is not to say that the legal system or the
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study brings to light a troubling assertion of executive power because it
demonstrates nonacquiescence to the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court, the circuit courts' uniform statements of the law governing
agency preemption, and clear statements of congressional intention.
A. Ignoring the Evolution of Supreme Court Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the conflict
between the need to uphold principles of federalism and therefore give
recognition to state laws and the need to promote the operations of
federally chartered institutions that are largely governed by federal laws.
Supreme Court case law in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century stated that state law must yield to federal law when dealing with
nationally chartered banks if state law "impairs the efficiency of the bank
to discharge the duties for which it was created."'" However, that standard
was probably altered by the Court as early as 1944, and certainly was
altered by the Court in its 1996 decision in Barnett. As early as 1944 the
Court recognized the power of a state to protect the interests of depositors
even when they were depositors of a national bank.42  It resolved the
tension between federal and state law when dealing with nationally
chartered entities such as national banks by ruling the "national banks are
subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws
or impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks' functions.
In other words "undue burden" was now the standard, not "impair the
efficiency" of a bank's exercise of its powers.
courts of appeals themselves should view with indifference widespread, unjustified
disregard of circuit law by administrative agencies (or other actors). For example, even in
the absence of Supreme Court review, at some point the law in a particular circuit and
across circuits will no longer be in flux." Estreicher and Revesz, supra note 38, at 727. See
also id. at 753 (suggesting nonacquiescence is justified only when it is an interim measure to
maintain uniform administration while the agency makes reasonable attempts to persuade
the courts to validate its preferred policy).
41. First Nat'l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 369 (1923). The Court
cited Davis v. Elmira, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896), although in Davis compliance with both
state and federal law was not possible. See also McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357
(1896) (discussing federalism concerns in the context of instrumentalities of the federal
government, and applying state law in this case because a state law regarding preferential
transfers in the event of insolvency was not in conflict with a general federal grant of
authority to receive real estate as security for a loan).
42. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241 (1944) (recognizing debtor
obligations are within the state's control because they are incurred in the state that the bank
is situated).
43. Id. at 248 (emphasis added). The court ruled that a state law governing disposition
of abandoned deposits was not in conflict with a general federal grant of power to accept
deposits.
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In 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court again considered the tension between
federal and state law when dealing with federal instrumentalities such as
national banks. It ruled:
In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations
granting a power to national banks, these cases take the view that
normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or impair
significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly
granted. To say this is not to deprive States of the power to
regulate national banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not
prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank's
exercise of its powers.4
The standard had several formulations-"undue burden," "impair
significantly," or "significantly interfere"-but the aim was the same:
avoid preempting state law unless there was a serious conflict with federal
law. The old standard of "impair" the efficiency of exercise of federal
power was implicitly overruled.
In Barnett the court then turned to the issue of conflict between
federal and state law in a specific context, namely explicit federal
authorization of a power for a national bank and the need, under state law,
to also obtain state permission for the exercise of such power. In that
specific context the court concluded that an explicit grant of a specific
federal power is not subject to the "condition" that state authorization must
also be obtained unless Congress indicated such additional authorization
was necessary. 45  This is a specific exception to the general principle
embodied in the "significant interference" test.
Thus, for many years the general standard for resolving the conflict
between state and federal law for federal instrumentalities such as national
banks has been the "significant" impairment or interference standard,
which was earlier described as the "undue" burden standard. It certainly is
not the former "impair" the efficiency of the exercise of federal powers
standard. This change has been uniformly recognized in Court of Appeals
decisions since 1996 reconciling conflicts between state and federal law for
national banks.46 The Ninth Circuit recently discussed the tension between
44. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (emphasis
added) (recognizing the relationship between state and Congress' ability to regulate banks).
See also discussion infra, note 59.
45. Id. at 34-35 (citing Franklin Nat'l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S.
373 (1954)).
46. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005) (using
significantly interfere standard); Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11 th Cir.
2005) (adopting substantially impair standard); Wells Fargo Bank of Texas N.A. v. James,
321 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing significantly interfere standard); Bank of
Am. v. City & County of San Francisco., 309 F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (utilizing
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principles of federalism that generally lead to a presumption against
preemption of state law and the status of national banks as federal
instrumentalities. It concluded:
In light of this history, we held in Bank of America that the usual
presumption against federal preemption of state law is
inapplicable to federal banking regulation .... Thus, in defining
the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations granting a
power to national banks, [the Supreme Court's jurisprudence]
takes the view that normally congress would not want states to
forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that
Congress has explicitly granted. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33.47
The general standard is also not a "condition" test. This is instead a
narrow exception to the general rule. Moreover, in light of the "significant
interference" standard, there is no blanket presumption that state laws are
inapplicable to national banks.
The OCC has not recognized this evolution of the preemption doctrine
in Supreme Court case law. The OCC ignored the "undue burden" test in
interpretive rulings issued in 1992 and 1995.48 Instead it continued to insist
that any law that impairs national banks' efficiency in exercising their
powers was preempted. The OCC also ignored the "significant"
interference and "undue" burden tests in regulations it issued in 200449 and
preemption determinations it made in 20030. Instead, the OCC applied the
old "impair efficiency" test and added a general "condition" test.
significantly interfere standard); Ass'n of Banks in Insurance, Inc. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397,
409 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying significantly interfere standard).
47. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 956-7 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
48. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 572, 1992 OCC
Ltr. LEXIS 1 (January 15, 1992) (noting national banks in New Jersey do not have to
comply with that state's laws that are preempted by federal law); Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, OCC Unpublished Interpretive Letter from Eric Thompson, Director, Bank
Activities and Structure Division, (May 3, 1995) (advising on federal preemption of Texas
law regarding national banks).
49. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and Operations; Real
Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1910 (Jan. 13, 2004) (attempting to
clarify when state laws apply to national banks). The OCC cites the Davis and McClellan
cases. See discussion supra, notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
50. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Preemption Determination and Order, 68
Fed. Reg. 46264, 46274 (Aug. 5, 2003) (citing Barnett for a general standard that states may
not alter or condition a national bank's exercise of power). See also earlier decisions in
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 674, 1995 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 73 (July
1995) (stating the rule as "unduly burdensome" or "impairs" the ability of national banks to
discharge the duties imposed by federal law, but finding no preemption in this case); Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 572, 1992 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 1
(Mar. 1992) (stating the standard as the "impair national banks' efficiency ... to discharge
their duties", and finding state law is preempted in this case); Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Interpretive Ruling Concerning National Bank Service Charges, 48 Fed. Reg.
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In fact, in a preemption determination in 2004, the OCC did not even
cite the Barnett case or refer to the "significant interference" or "undue
burden" test at all. Instead, it merely cited the terms of its 2004 regulations
and preempted an Indiana statute restricting the terms of balloon payment
loans because the provisions of the statute "impose limitations on the terms
of credit extended by a national bank.,
51
The "condition" test has been applied across the board by the OCC,
rather than in the specific context in which it was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court-namely explicit federal statutory authorization of a
specific power and the need to obtain additional state authorization prior to
the exercise of such power, as imposed by state law. In the OCC's view, a
state cannot condition the exercise of federal power on compliance with
any state requirements such as consumer protection statutes.
The OCC cites the Barnett case and the Franklin National Bank case
to support this position. However, the Franklin National Bank case never
used the phrase "condition" the grant of federal power. In addition it
cannot be read to prohibit all conditions or restrictions upon exercise of
federal powers. The decision was based on a conflict between federal and
state law, where state law prohibited the use of the term "savings" in bank
advertisements or transactions and federal law authorized national banks to
receive deposits "without qualification or limitation."52  The court
concluded there was a direct conflict between the grant of federal power
and the restrictions imposed by state law. As it explained:
We cannot believe that the incidental powers granted to national
banks should be construed so narrowly as to preclude the use of
advertising in any branch of their authorized business. It would
require some affirmative indication to justify an interpretation
that would permit a national bank to engage in a business but
gave no right to let the public know about it.... There appears to
be a clear conflict between the law of New York and the law of
the Federal Government. We cannot resolve conflicts of
54319 (Dec. 2, 1983) (stating the standard as "impair the efficiency of national banks"). In
an interpretive letter in 2005 the OCC did decide not to preempt the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act but did so only because the national banks in question did not originate or
purchase any of the loans in question but were merely acting as trustees for the benefit of
investors in the trusts that purchased the loans. However, in that decision the OCC
continued to insist on a broad standard of federal preemption, but concluded the law did not
"obstruct, impair, condition or otherwise interfere with the Banks' exercise of fiduciary
powers .... " Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 1016, (Feb.
2005).
51. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 1015 (Feb. 2005).
52. Franklin Nat'l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 376 (1954).
See also Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 390-91 (6th Cir. 1994).
286 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:2
authority by our judgment as to the wisdom or need of either
conflicting policy. 3
Barnett does use the phrase "condition" the exercise of federal power.
However, it does so in a specific context. Namely, the issue in Barnett was
whether additional state authorization was necessary when federal law
already grants an explicit authorization to exercise a specific power, e.g.
the power to act as an insurance agent, and does not explicitly require
additional state authorization. Barnett does not support a general
preemption standard that any condition or restriction on the manner in
which federal power is exercised is preempted.
The OCC's position reveals an attempt to expand executive power
through the aggressive stance of nonacquiescence to judicial decisions.
The OCC is refusing to follow the uniform decisions of the circuit courts
which have stated the governing standard by which to determine the
existence of conflict preemption in the context of federal banking
regulation. It is justifying that position by ignoring the evolution of United
States Supreme Court doctrine and, instead, picking and choosing
individual words or phrases in Supreme Court decisions without reference
to the general standards of law announced in the cases and the actual
outcomes in the cases in question or the factual context that give the words
or phrases meaning. The recent United States Supreme Court's decision in
Watters demonstrates how troubling this approach can be because it
increases the likelihood of unchecked executive power. In its opinion in
Watters, the United States Supreme Court cited the Barnett decision and
the earlier Franklin National Bank decision when stating the governing
legal standard. It reiterated that states are permitted to regulate the activities
of national banks when doing so "does not prevent or significantly
interfere" with the national bank's or the national bank regulator's exercise
of its powers.54
However, in other parts of its decision, the court spoke of the state law
in question not being permitted to "interfere" with the business of banking
when it "conditioned" real estate lending on registration with the state and
subjected it to the State's investigative and enforcement machinery.55 The
court also stated that state law may not "significantly burden ... a national
bank's own exercise of its real estate lending power, just as it may not
53. Id. at 377-78.
54. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 127 S.Ct. 1559, 1567 (2007). See also id. at 1570
(requiring significant burden) and 1571 (stating security against significant interference by
state regulators is a characteristic condition of the "business of banking" conducted by
national banks).
55. Id. at 1568, 1573.
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curtail or hinder a national bank's efficient exercise of any other power
,,56
Thus the OCC, picking and choosing whatever word or phrase suits its
purpose, might claim that Watters recognized not only a "significant
interference" test, but also an "interfere" or "condition" standard for
conflict preemption, as well as a standard that state law may not "hinder"
the exercise of federal power. Indeed, in recent testimony before Congress,
this is exactly the position taken by the Comptroller.5 7 This ignores that the
Court was consistently applying the "significant interference" test in the
Watters opinion and using the words "interfere" or "hinder" as descriptions
of that effect in the case at hand. 8 This conclusion is further confirmed by
the Court's citations following the phrase "curtail or hinder" in the Watters
decision.59
The OCC has ignored the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine. It has
also read Franklin National and Barnett to allow it to preempt any state law
imposing any restriction on the exercise of federal power. As a result of
this view, the OCC's final regulations all preempt any "state laws that
obstruct, impair or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise" any
of its federal authorized powers except where state law is made applicable
by federal law.60
The agency's nonacquiescence viewpoint effectively leads to
unchecked executive power. The Comptroller is ignoring uniform Circuit
Court statements of the governing law and relying on its own reading of
United States Supreme Court decisions. However, the United States
Supreme Court issues few opinions that can check an agency's
interpretation of the scope of conflict preemption.6 1 When the Court issues
56. Id. at 1567-68.
57. Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearings Before
the Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong., 27 (2007) (testimony of John C. Dugan,
Comptroller of the Currency), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2007-
57b.pdf (state law may not "significantly burden, curtail, or hinder" a national bank's
efficient exercise of any of its powers) (emphasis added).
58. E.g., Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1571 ("Security against significant interference by state
regulators is a characteristic condition of the "business of banking" conducted by national
banks, and mortgage lending is one aspect of that business.").
59. The court cites Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33-34
(1996). At that point in its opinion, the court noted that various earlier decisions had used
various phrases to describe situations involving conflict preemption, such as "encroach,"
"hamper," "interfere," and "impair" and concluded, "[i]n defining the pre-emptive scope of
statutes and regulations granting a power to national banks, these cases take the view that
normally Congress would not want states to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of
a power that Congress has explicitly granted."
60. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b) (deposit taking power), 7.4008(d) (lending authority),
7.4009(b) (all national bank activities), 34.4(a) (real estate lending power) (2005).
61. David G. Savage, The High Court's New Term is Light on Load, But the Subjects
Are Still Spicy, ABA J., Oct. 2006 at 12 (reporting that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
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an opinion, an agency can often find verbiage that, when cited out of
context, supports the agency's broad view of conflict preemption. Finally,
by not recognizing the evolution of doctrine over time, the agency can
always pick and choose verbiage from earlier United States Supreme Court
decisions which support its broader position.
Such unchecked exercise of executive power has another dimension
that is illustrated by the OCC's preemption determinations. In addition to
asserting a right of nonacquiescence in the uniform decisions of the federal
circuit courts, the OCC's position goes one step further and asserts a power
of nonacquiescene to the clear statements of Congressional intention. This
is examined below.
B. Ignoring Legislative History
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that any
determination of the scope of federal preemption of state law is a matter
calling for ascertainment of Congressional intention.62 Congress addressed
the issue of the applicability of state law to the activities of national banks
in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994, the 1997 Amendments to the Act 63 , and in various federal consumer
protection and fair lending statutes. In all these enactments Congress
stipulated a preference for state law, especially in the areas of consumer
protection and fair lending, and a concern for overly aggressive OCC
preemption of state law. The 1994 statute itself does not illuminate the
issue of preference,' however, its legislative history makes clear
court routinely issued more than 150 opinions each term, but in recent years, it typically
issues fewer than seventy-five opinions). See also Matthew Diller and Nancy Morawetz,
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to
Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 810-811 (1990) (the decisional capacity of the
United States Supreme Court is small, and it frequently addresses narrowly framed
questions that leave many matters unresolved).
62. Barnett, 517 U.S. at 30; Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 152 (1982).
63. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994); Interstate Branch Banking, Pub. L. No. 105-24, 111 Stat.
238 (1997).
64. "The laws of the host State regarding community reinvestment, consumer
protection, fair lending, and establishment of intra-state branches shall apply to any branch
in the host State of an out-of-State national bank to the same extent as such State laws apply
to a branch of a bank chartered by that State, except-
(i) when Federal law preempts the application of such State laws to a national
back; or
(ii) when the Comptroller of the Currency determines that the application of
such State laws would have a discriminatory effect on the branch in comparison
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preference for some state laws. The House Report on the Act stated,
"Consumer protection, fair lending, and community reinvestment laws
have been areas of traditional State concern. The Committee does not
intend to distribute these traditional regulatory schemes. 65
The Conference Report was more explicit. It recognized the strong
interest states have in the activities of depository institutions doing business
in their jurisdictions and in protecting their consumers, businesses, and
66 I plcommunities. In applying state law to national banks' operations, the
Conference Report went out of its way to point out that: "Courts generally
use a rule of construction that avoids finding a conflict between the Federal
and State law where possible. This title does not change these judicially
established principles., 67 It then criticized past OCC preemption rulings
that took a broader view of preemption authority.68
The Congressional concern regarding overly aggressive OCC
preemption determinations found its way into a statutory mandate in 1994
as well. The mandate is that any proposed agency preemption opinion
letter or interpretive ruling with regard to state laws involving community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and the establishment of
interstate branches must be published in the Federal Register, and give
interested parties an opportunity to comment on the issue under
consideration. 69 This new requirement was "intended to help focus any
administrative preemption analysis and to help ensure that an agency only
makes a preemption determination when the legal basis is compelling and
the Federal Policy interest is clear.' 70
In floor debates, the bill's main sponsor, Senator Riegle, confirmed
that all banks had traditionally been required to conform with state laws on
consumer protection, fair lending and community reinvestment, and
assured other members of the Senate that state authority over national
banks in the areas of consumer protection, community reinvestment, and
fair lending would not be diminished.7
with the effect the application of such State laws would have with respect to
branches of a bank chartered by the host State."
12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A) (2000).
65. H.R. REP. No. 103-448, at 24 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2047.
66. H.R. REP. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2074.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 53-54. Specifically the Conference Report criticized OCC Interpretive Letter
572, issued in 1992, for preempting state law when the federal policy interest in doing so
was not clear, and the interpretive ruling found in 12 C.F.R. § 7.800 because it was an
overly broad preemption of any state law that attempts to prohibit, limit or restrict deposit
account service charges.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 43 (2000).
70. H.R..REP. No. 103-651, supra note 66, at 55 (emphasis added).
71. Mr. GRAHAM.
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Congressional concern regarding overly aggressive OCC preemption
of state law again found its way into a statutory mandate in 1997. The
Amendments to the Rielge-Neal Act imposed a requirement that the OCC
conduct an annual review of its preemption determinations and include the
results of the review and the reasons for each such action in its annual
report to Congress.12 The floor debates on the legislation made it clear that
the requirement was imposed due to concern that "the Comptroller has
undertaken preemptive actions which were unnecessarily expansive. 73
In addition to the terms and legislative history of the 1994 Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking Act and 1997 Amendments to the Act, federal consumer
protection and fair lending laws have consistently recognized the desire to
preserve state law to the greatest degree possible. Such federal statutes use
the same standard for recognition of state law. For example, the Truth in
I would like to bring to the attention of the Chairman the concern of a number
of my colleagues with the section of the bill dealing with applicable State law.
My concern is that the section will result in the significant loss of authority for
the States. Currently through their banking laws and their bank holding
company statutes, States are able to require all banks to conform with a wide
variety of State laws. States have applied laws in the areas of consumer
protection, community reinvestment, and fair lending as well as a number of
reporting and notification requirements to these institutions.
We need to look at the financial system from the eyes of the users of the
services, the consumers. We need to have uniformity and predictability. At the
same time we need to have standards that best achieve the needs of the
community. We must recognize the diversity of the community needs across
the Nation and provide laws that allow communities to reflect those different
needs ....
Mr. RIEGLE.
... .Under the reported bill, the States do not lose any authority that they
already have over national banks. The bill also avoids having two classes of
national banks resulting, interstate and intrastate, with each type of bank subject
to different laws.
I would just add that we worked hard in the committee to preserve the contours
of the dual banking system in crafting this legislation and have not tried to alter
the existing balance of power between the Federal and the State levels. The
reported bill endeavors to maintain the status quo regarding a State's ability to
regulate the activities of national banks operating in that State ....
140 CONG. REC. S4819 (1994).
72. Pub. L. 105-24 § 2(b), 111 Stat. 239 (1997) (codified as 12 U.S.C § 36(f)(1)(C)).
The first such report was required to encompass all actions taken since January 1, 1992.
73. 143 CONG. REC. S5638 (1997) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes); 143 CONG. REC. S5637
(1997) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). Senator Sarbanes repeated the concerns raised by
examples of overly expansive interpretations by the OCC enumerated in the 1994
conference report on the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act, supra note 68, and added a
further subsequent example in the form of a 1996 OCC regulation exempting national banks
from state laws protecting consumers from high credit card fees. Id.
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Lending Act provides that it does "not annul, alter or affect the laws of any
state . . . . except to the extent those laws are inconsistent with the
provisions of this subchapter and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency. 74 The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act use the
same standard and then add "[t]he Secretary may not determine that any
state law is inconsistent with any provision of this chapter if the Secretary
determines that such law gives greater protection to the consumer."75
Similarly, older federal consumer protection statutes, such as the
Federal Trade Commission Act,76 that do not explicitly preserve state law,
have been interpreted not to occupy the field of consumer protection.
Instead state laws are "only supplanted when inadequate or
counterproductive to the Commission's regulations., 77  This conclusion
was based on the legislative history of the statute.78
Faced with a Congressional directive to preserve state law to the
greatest degree possible, especially in the area of consumer protection, fair
lending and community reinvestment, how has the OCC responded?
Rather than taking a narrow view of the extent of federal preemption, the
OCC has repeatedly attempted a broad preemption of state law. As early as
1983 the OCC concluded: "A national bank may establish any deposit
account service charge ... notwithstanding any state laws which prohibit
the charge assessed or limit or restrict the amount of that charge.,
79
The rationale was that state laws impair the efficiency of national
banks' exercise of their powers, and any state law impediments to national
bank flexibility have potentially serious implications for their continued
safety and soundness. The OCC also added that the comprehensive federal
statutory scheme governing deposit-taking preempts state laws.8°
The Conference Report on the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
Act specifically criticized this OCC ruling as an overbroad assertion of its
authority to preempt state law. What was the OCC's response? In 1996 it
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (2000) (Truth in Lending Act, also applicable to the
provisions of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1995, which was directed
at predatory lending practices).
75. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (2000). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f)
(2000).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (2000).
77. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. F.T.C., 767 F.2d 957, 989 n.41 (1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1011 (1986).
78. Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1974), as reprinted in, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7726.
79. 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000(c), reprinted in 48 Fed. Reg. 54319 (1983) (emphasis added).
80. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Interpretive Ruling Concerning National
Bank Service Charges, 49 Fed. Reg. 28237 (1984). This last conclusion was contrary to that
drawn by California's highest court. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal.
1985), appeal dismissed for want ofjurisdiction, 475 U.S. 1170 (1986).
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revised its ruling to employ a case-by-case evaluation of whether particular
charges or fees may be imposed notwithstanding contrary state law.'
However, more recently the OCC returned to its former position that it
would broadly preempt state law, even though there had been no change in
legislative intent since 1994. Indeed, the intent to sanction only a narrow
preemption of state law had been reaffirmed in the 1997 Amendments to
the Reagle-Neal Interstate Banking Act. 82 The OCC's 2004 revisions of
Part 7 and Part 34 of its regulations preempt any state laws that "obstruct,
impair, or condition" a national bank's ability to fully exercise its deposit-
taking powers, non-real estate lending powers, real estate lending powers,
and any other activities authorized under federal law.83
The rationale for this broad preemption of state law was that "[w]hen
national banks are unable to operate under uniform, consistent, and
predictable standards their business suffers, which negatively affects their
safety and soundness. 84
In its 2004 regulations, the OCC also presented an inaccurate view on
the issue of the presumptive applicability of state law to the activities of
national banks. The OCC concluded:
[N]o Federal statute endorses the presumptive application of
state laws to national banks. Although the national bank
branching statute makes applicable the laws of the host state
regarding community reinvestment, consumer protection, and fair
lending to branches of an out-of-state national bank located in the
host state to the same extent as those laws apply to a bank
chartered by that state, the statute expressly excepts any case
where Federal law preempts the application of state law to
national banks. 5
This broad statement is not true with respect to state consumer
protection, fair lending, and community reinvestment laws. The federal
statutes discussed above and the legislative history of the 1994 Reagle-Neal
Interstate Banking Act and 1997 Amendments to the Act evidence a
81. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Rulings, 61 Fed. Reg. 4849
(1996), replacing 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000 with 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002.
82. Supra, notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text.
83. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d), 34.4(a), and 7.4009(b) (emphasis added). The
OCC stated its regulations do not occupy the field, Bank Activities and Operations; Real
Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1911 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 7 and 34), although commentators have concluded otherwise. Id. at 1906 and
Wilmarth, supra note 37, at 252.
84. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 1908.
85. Scope of National Bank Preemption, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119, 46,122 (Aug. 5, 2003)
(proposed amendments to Parts 7 and 34 of the OCC regulations) (emphasis added).
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Congressional intent that such specific state laws generally apply to the
operations of national banks.
In recent years commentators have debated the usefulness of
legislative materials as a vehicle for statutory interpretation. However, the
actions of the OCC selectively ignore the statutory language itself and its
implications. Moreover, the courts remain committed to use of materials
contained in a statute's legislative history, particularly Committee Reports
and statements of a bill's sponsor86-the very materials ignored by the
OCC. The United States Supreme Court, in particular, remains committed
to use of such materials.
87
In addition to ignoring the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine and
ignoring legislative history, the OCC's advocacy stance had also led it to
minimize the need to protect consumer interests. This is explored below.
C. Serving the "Public Interest "-A Comparison ofAgency Viewpoints
To what extent has the OCC demonstrated a commitment to serving
the needs of the general public in its preemption determinations? The
OCC's 2004 preemption regulations, and the justifications and analysis
offered by the OCC in its proposal and final regulation, offer an interesting
comparison to the actions and approach taken in 2005 by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in response to a request that it
similarly preempt state law for state banking institutions operating across
state lines.
The OCC's proposed rule in 2003 emphasized that the National Bank
Act sought to assure that the OCC would have authority to "protect
national banks from potentially hostile state interference. 88
When the OCC issued its final rule in 2004 preempting a broad array
of state laws applicable to national bank activities, it explained the interests
the rule sought to protect. There was almost no mention at all of the
interests of consumers or other members of the general public. Instead the
OCC emphasized it was charged with the responsibility of "ensuring that
national banks operate on a safe and sound basis .... [T]his responsibility
includes enabling the national banking system to operate.., without undue
86. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of
Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 263 and 274 (2000).
87. Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 207 and 209 (2000) (Justices Breyer and Stevens have
assembled a majority of the Court for selective use of legislative history when committee
reports explain details of the legislation); Noah, supra note 86, at 275 (committee reports
and statements made by a bill's sponsors during floor debates deserve the greatest weight,
based on review of Supreme Court decisions).
88. Scope of National Bank Preemption, supra note 85, at 46,120.
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confinement of their powers."89 It went on to point out that market changes
"highlight the significance of being able to conduct a banking business
pursuant to consistent, national standards and ... accentuate the costs and
interference that diverse and potentially conflicting state and local laws
have on the ability of national banks to operate under the powers of their
Federal Charter."90 The OCC concluded that when banks are not able to
operate under uniform standards, "their business suffers, which negatively
affects their safety and soundness." 9'
There was no mention of the equally important interest of federalism
and the preservation of state law to the greatest degree possible. There was
also almost no mention of the interests of consumers and the additional
protections afforded by state consumer protection, fair lending, community
reinvestment, and other laws aimed at protecting the interests of the general
public. The only mention of consumers' interests was the following:
Even the efforts of a single state to regulate the operations of a
national bank operating only within that state can have a
detrimental effect on that bank's operations and consumers. As
we explained in our recent preemption determination and order
responding to National City Bank's inquiry concerning the
Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA), the GFLA caused secondary
market participants to cease purchasing certain Georgia
mortgages and many mortgage lenders to stop making mortgage
loans in Georgia. National banks have also been forced to
withdraw from some products and markets in other states as a
result of the impact of state and local restrictions on their
activities.92
This statement was issued on January 13, 2004. Yet, ten months
earlier the Georgia legislature had amended its predatory lending law and
lenders had reentered the market in response to the amendment. 93 In
addition, by this date twenty-five states had adopted predatory lending laws
and the beneficial effects of such laws to consumers had already been
89. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.,
at 1907.
90. Id. at 1908.
91. Id.
92. Id. (footnote omitted).
93. Erick Bergquist, Georgia Legislature Amends Anti-Predator Law, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 7, 2003, at 20; Erick Bergquist, Will Georgia 'Fix'Hurt or Help Federal Law's Case?
As State Rolls Back Law's Toughest Provisions, AM. BANKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 1 (lenders
now plan to reenter the market). Representative Carson, of the House Financial Services
Committee, had a different view of the Georgia statute and its lessons for federal
preemption determinations. She stated the amendment of the Georgia statute "calls into
question the need for making federal preemption part of any predatory-lending legislation
considered by Congress. It is clear the states are still discerning the best formulation of
consumer protections that maintain housing investment in low-income communities." Id.
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documented.94 Yet the OCC fails to mention this evidence. It only states
that it is committed to avoiding abusive lending practices in the national
banking system.95
Finally, mention of the Georgia statute is curious because the example
does not support the broad preemption rule the OCC chose to adopt. The
original Georgia law caused ratings agencies for mortgage-backed
securities to refuse to rate mortgages made in Georgia 96, and the secondary
market had refused to purchase such loans. 97 This led lenders to withdraw
from the Georgia market, and was thus an example of a state law that
would "significantly interfere" with or "unduly burden" the exercise of real
estate lending power. In other words, this is a situation that would justify
preemption under a narrow preemption standard.
The OCC's regulatory actions in 2003-2004 are not the only example
of the agency's embrace of the interests of the industry over the interests of
consumers and state governments. In more than a dozen lawsuits in recent
years, the OCC has consistently sided with banking institutions seeking to
strike down state or local laws protecting consumer interests.98
The position taken by the OCC offers an interesting contrast to that
taken by the FDIC. In 2005, the FDIC was petitioned to preempt state laws
for state chartered banks operating across state lines.99 In contrast to the
OCC's policy and actions in 2003-2004, the FDIC has demonstrated a
recognition of, and commitment to protect, the interests of consumers and
the interests of state governments. In fact, the FDIC called a public hearing
94. General Accounting Office, Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies Face
Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending, GAO Report 04-412T at 2 (Feb. 24, 2004) (as
of January 2004, twenty-five states, eleven localities, and the District of Columbia had
passed laws addressing predatory lending); KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRES, AND ERIC STEIN,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NORTH CAROLINA'S SUBPRIME HOME LOAN MARKET AFTER
PREDATORY LENDING REFORM (2002),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/HMDAStudy-onNCMarket.pdf (by preventing
predatory terms, the North Carolina law is estimated to have saved borrowers more than
$100 million, while subprime lending continues to thrive in North Carolina).
95. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1914.
96. Diana B. Henriques & Jonathan Fuerburger, Bankers Opposing New State Curbs on
Unfair Loans, AM. BANKER, Feb. 14, 2003, at, 1 (Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch
Rating rocked Wall Street by announcing last month they would no longer give credit
ratings to securitization trusts that buy any home loans from Georgia).
97. Jenny Wiggins, Georgia Rattles US Home Equity Market, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2003, at 29 (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have said they will not buy high-cost mortgages
in the State of Georgia; more than 40 lenders have stopped originating mortgages in
Georgia).
98. Jess Braven and Paul Beckett, Federal Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting
Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at 1 (claiming OCC sides with banks because they
rely on lender's fees).
99. See Petition from the Financial Services Roundtable, March 4, 2005. reprinted in 70
Fed. Reg. 13417 (Mar. 21, 2005).
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on the matter. In that public hearing it raised twelve specific issues on
which it sought guidance. Consumer and federalism interests were at the
top of the list of issues raised. Namely, the FDIC asked:
G- 1. Is a preemptive rule in these areas necessary to preserve the
dual banking system?
G-2. What would be the impact on consumers if a preemptive
rule were issued in these areas?
G-3. What are the implications of rule making in these areas for
state banking regulation?
G-4. Would the measures urged by Petitioner achieve
competitive balance between federally-chartered and state-
chartered financial institutions as advocated by the Petitioner?100
Not only does the FDIC voice a concern for the interests of consumers
and individual states in exercising oversight over activities conducted in
their state, the FDIC also was not overly aggressive in asserting its power
to preempt state law. This is revealing in that the 1997 Amendments to the
Riegle-Neal Act clearly grant such power to the FDIC. They provide:
The laws of a host State, including laws regarding community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and
establishment of intrastate branches, shall apply to any branch in
the host State of an out-of-State State bank to the same extent as
such State laws apply to a branch in the host State of an out-of-
State national bank.' 0'
After the OCC issued its final rule preempting state laws for nationally
chartered banks in 2004, this statutory provision would explicitly grant the
FDIC the power to preempt state law as well, and to the same extent that
the OCC can preempt state law. The FDIC, however, has been cautious
about exercising that power. Instead it asked:
G-5. Are there alternative mechanisms available that would
achieve the policy goals advocated by the Petitioner?
G-6. Should the issue of competitive parity in interstate
operations be left to Congress?
G-7. If the FDIC determines that it has the legal authority to
proceed with a preemptive rule, are there reasons why the FDIC
should decline to do so? If so, what are they?
102
100. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain
Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. 13413, 13414 (Mar. 21, 2005).
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1) (2000). The power is explicitly granted with respect to
state laws applicable to branches of state-chartered banks. The power may not, however,
extend to preemption of state laws applicable to operating subsidiaries and loan offices. See
Hannah Bergman, Gauging Odds for Exemption Plan at FDIC, AM. BANKER, Aug. 2, 2005,
at 1.
102. FDIC, Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13414.
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In October 2005 the FDIC issued a proposed rule on the preemption
petition before it.' °3 The proposed rule preempts the state law of a host
state for a branch of an out-of-state bank "to the same extent" that such law
does not apply to a branch of a national bank.' °4 This is not surprising
since the federal statute specifically calls for preemption. °5
It also gave a somewhat broad reach to the preemption determination
by interpreting the statutory phrase that describes the state laws preempted
as those that "apply to a branch". It defined this phrase to mean the
"activity of, by, through, in, from, or substantially involving, a branch" in a
host state. 10 6 However, unlike the OCC, in reaching this conclusion the
FDIC resorted to, extensively documented, and relied upon congressional
intent. Specifically, the FDIC considered the purpose behind the federal
statute as found in its legislative history, and it reviewed committee reports
and statements of the statute's sponsors.0 7 Unlike the OCC, the FDIC did
not ignore evidence of congressional intent because it was contained in the
statute's legislative history.'0 8
A second useful comparison in agency viewpoint is provided by the
OCC and FDIC's determinations in 2001 and 2002 regarding federal
preemption of the same statute-the Michigan Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act. The Michigan statute required licensing of loan lending
agents in the state and possibly the originating bank itself, subjected the
loans to Michigan interest rate limits and remedies for noncompliance, and
imposed requirements concerning the form and content of the installment
sales contracts and the disclosures required to be made to the buyer. The
103. FDIC, Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60019 (Oct.
14, 2005) (giving notice of proposed rulemaking). The FDIC has not issued a final rule.
104. FDIC, Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60030-
60031 (proposing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 362.19(c)). Since the financial institution is state
chartered, the law of the home state would apply. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1) (2000).
105. "The laws of a host State, including laws regarding community reinvestment,
consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment of intrastate branches, shall apply to
any branch in the host State of an out-of-State State bank to the same extent as such State
laws apply to a branch in the host State of an out-of-State national bank. To the extent host
State law is inapplicable to a branch of an out-of-State State bank in such host State
pursuant to the preceding sentence, home State law shall apply to such branch." 12 U.S.C. §
1831 a(j)(l) (2000).
106. FDIC, Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60023
(specifying statutory language regarding how the law applies to both out-of-state state banks
and national bank branches).
107. FDIC, Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60024
(discussing congressional intent). In this case the FDIC found neither committee reports nor
conference reports on point, but relied upon the statements of the statute's sponsors.
108. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that in ascertaining Congress'
intention to preempt or not preempt state law the courts should examine both the relevant
statute and its legislative history. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-3 (1961)).
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OCC concluded that the entire statute was preempted. Initially, the OCC
stated that the test it could employ for its preemption analysis was not only
the "significantly interference" test but also the "restrict or condition" a
grant of power test.10 9 By contrast, the FDIC cited the Barnett case but
employed solely a "disproportionate impact" test."0 Thus, the FDIC was
more conservative in its view of the governing standard for a preemption
determination.
When deciding the petition before it, the OCC ultimately did rely on
the "significant interference" test and it then chose to preempt the Michigan
statute in its entirety. By contrast, the FDIC attempted to preserve state law
to the extent that it was able. It ruled:
Based upon the facts presented and the foregoing legal analysis, I
believe that the Act as interpreted and applied by the Bureau is
not preempted by section 27, except to the extent out-of-state
federally insured state banks making loans to Michigan residents
through Michigan agents would be required to comply, either
directly or through their Michigan agents, with the Michigan
interest limitations and remedies contained in the Act."'
This case study comparing the actions of the OCC and FDIC on the
issue of federal preemption of state law documents two very different
approaches and viewpoints. The OCC has ignored the evolution of
Supreme Court doctrine. It has also selectively excerpted the language of
Supreme Court decisions and given the language a broad interpretation-
ignoring a narrower interpretation intended by the Court as evidenced by
the specific fact pattern that led the Court to employ a particular word or
phrase. Finally, the OCC has ignored repeated statements of congressional
intent in available legislative history that contradicts the broad preemption
standard it chooses to embrace. The effect of this viewpoint, its actions in
interpretive letters and rulings preempting specific state statutes, and its
decision to intervene in pending litigation against banking institutions to
consistently advocate for preemption, has been to promote the interests of
109. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Preemption Determination, 66 Fed. Reg.
28,593, 28595-28596 (May 23, 2001) (discussing Michigan law regarding automobile
dealers and the idea that state law is preempted if it restricts powers given to national banks
by the federal government).
110. Does Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act Preempt the Michigan Motor
Vehicle Sales Act, FDIC 02-06, 2002 WL 32361502 (December 19, 2002) (responding to a
request from a state chartered out-of-state bank making loans in Michigan through motor
vehicle dealers in the state. It was based on interpretation of a federal statute granting state
chartered institutions the power to export interest rates. The banking entity was not a
federal instrumentality. However, if the FDIC had embraced the broad view of Supreme
Court jurisprudence the OCC embraced, it could have prohibited any condition or restriction
on any federal grant of power.).
111. Id. at 4984.72 (emphasis added).
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national banks while downplaying or ignoring the interests of consumers
and of state governments.
By contrast, the FDIC has taken a narrow view of its power to
preempt state law. It has recognized that this narrow view has been
embraced in evolving Supreme Court case law. It has also resorted to and
relied upon congressional intent in reaching its decisions, and thoroughly
examined available legislative history to document that intention. Finally,
in its decision-making process and in its actions, the FDIC has been
cognizant of the importance of the need to protect the interests of
consumers and state governments.
Why has the OCC acted in such an aggressive manner while the FDIC
has sought to preserve state law? The OCC regulates only national banks
and therefore its constituency in the financial services industry is only the
national banking industry. FDIC regulates both national and state chartered
banks as long as they are federally insured. It gains or loses no
constituency due to a preemption determination.
This constituency concern is evident in the OCC's pronouncements.
The Comptroller has highlighted the advantage for banking institutions of a
national charter, in part based on freedom from state law. For example,
Comptroller John Hawke stated: "The ability of national banks to conduct
a multistate business subject to a single uniform set of federal laws, under
the supervision of a single regulator, free from visitorial powers of various
state authorities, is a major advantage of the national charter."'
' 12
The OCC's aggressive stance toward preemption has yielded benefits
for its jurisdiction and power. As of 2003, state banks' share of total assets
in the banking system was approximately 45%. This dropped to 33% in
2004 by year-end, while national banks' share of assets climbed from 55%
to approximately 67%. The change was the result of large charter
conversions after the OCC issued its preemption rules." 3 If conversions to
national charter continue, especially among large institutions operating
across state lines, the state banking system's share of assets could drop to
17%. 1 14
112. John Hawke, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before the Women in Banking
and Finance, Washington, D.C. 2 (Feb. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002- 1 Oa.doc.
113. John S. Allison, Chairman, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Testimony at the
FDIC Public Hearing on Preemption Petition (May 24, 2005),
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/RegulatoryAffairs/FederalPreemption/CSBS
TestimonyFSRPetitionFDICBoard.pdf.
114. Karen M. Thomas, Executive Vice President and Director of Government Relations
for Independent Community Bankers of America, Testimony at the FDIC Public Hearing on
Preemption Petition (May 24, 2005),
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test052405.pdf.
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW
Should courts defer to preemption determinations of federal agencies?
To date, the debate has centered on expertise-that of federal agencies
versus the expertise of the judiciary. This Article has considered another
significant factor: agency bias. Agencies subject to conflicts of interest are
likely to interpret and apply legal standards governing preemption in an
aggressive, overly broad manner. As a result, the interests of state
governments (federalism interests) and the interests of consumers (the
public interest) receive little attention and protection.
The judiciary's reluctance to review agency determinations is due to a
recognition that decisions resolving conflict between federal and state law
inevitably requires expertise in assessing the existence of an undue burden
or significant interference with granted powers. This is based, in part, on an
assessment of the ability of the industry to harmonize and efficiently
comply with both federal and state requirements. Courts have been
reluctant to make such assessments. One response to the evidence of OCC
bias in our case study would be for the courts to insist that the OCC, in its
regulations and decisions, apply only the "substantial interference" test. In
this way the courts would be deciding only questions of law. The courts
have, in fact, uniformly employed the "significant interference" test when
reviewing specific OCC preemption determinations." 5
However, that alone would not serve the purpose of ensuring greater
protection for the interests of state governments and the interests of
consumers. Under the Chevron standard of review, the OCC's decision
that a particular state law or requirement constitutes a "significant
interference" with the exercise of a national bank's powers, as opposed to a
"condition" on the exercise of such powers, must be "reasonable." There is
almost always a difference of opinion regarding the negative impact of a
state law. For example, in the recent debate regarding the cost of
compliance with varying state predatory lending laws, industry spokesmen
have all concluded compliance is very burdensome. 116 Yet, public interest
115. See supra note 46.
116. See Congressional Review of OCC Preemption: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 215
(2004) (statement of Edward L. Yingling on behalf of the American Bankers Association)
(stating that absent preemption, the proliferation of state and local laws would inevitably
lead at best to higher operating costs and higher prices for financial services; and at worst to
reduction in available credit and fewer product options); id. at 66 (statement of Joe Belew,
President, Consumer Bankers Association) (stating that banks today operate across many
state lines, provide quality products and services, and through competition drive out the bad
actors, but their ability to do so is severely hampered by the laws adopted in each
jurisdiction. Forcing national banks to comply with these myriad of state laws would make
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groups have documented that costs are likely to be minimal." 7 If we leave
it to the agency to choose which evidence to rely upon, the OCC will rely
on the former and discount the latter. It will then conclude that the
interference with the national banks' exercise of their federal powers is
"significant." A court would typically refuse to overturn the determination
because it is a "reasonable" one-i.e. based on some evidence. 18
A sample of cases that supports this conclusion is found in the Circuit
Court decisions since the Barnett case confirmed that state law would only
be preempted when it "significantly interfered" with a national bank's
exercise of its powers. Every court that has applied this test against the
Chevron standard of deferential review has sustained the bank agency's
decision to preempt state law, concluding that the agencies' decision was a
"reasonable" one.'19 The only court that has not sustained the bank
agencies' decision is the court that did not apply Chevron but subjected the
case to de novo review. 120  This result is consistent with earlier, more
extensive studies of the frequency with which courts sustain agency
determinations under a deferential standard of review, including Chevron's
it difficult if not impossible for national banks to operative in the efficient manner
envisioned by the National Bank Act).
117. DELVIN M. DAVIS & ELLEN SCHLOEMER, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, STRONG
COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS SUPPORT PROFITABLE LENDING WHILE REDUCING PREDATORY
PRACTICES, CRL ISSUE PAPER No. 10 (July 26, 2005)
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ip 00-Compliance_.Costs-0705.pdf (stating that
cost of compliance with state predatory lending laws is about one dollar per loan due to use
of automated systems). See also the debate over the negative impact, if any, on the
availability of subprime loans in states with predatory lending laws. Center for Responsible
Lending, Comparison of Two Studies on the NC Predatory Lending Law,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/research/crl crc.cfm.
118. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.6 171-74 (Aspen
Law & Bus. 4th ed. 2002) (explaining that the standard that an agency's decision must be
"reasonable" requires that the decision not be "arbitrary or capricious" and that a decision
would be arbitrary or capricious if the agency relied on factors which Congress had not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation contrary to the evidence before the agency, or was so implausible it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise); see also
Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1253 (1997) (arguing that arbitrary and capricious is the standard in step-two Chevron
analysis).
119. See Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia
Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris,
419 F.3d 949, 961 (9th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 321 (2d
Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 2003); Bank of
Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 563-64 (9th Cir. 2002); Bank One v.
Gattau, 190 F.3d 844, 849 (8th Cir. 1999).
120. Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1302 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (finding that the
Georgia statute does not substantially impair the right created by federal law).
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standard of deference. 12 1 In our sample, the outcome was dramatically
altered in favor of upholding the agency determination. Thus a heightened
standard of review is necessary.
What is the alternative to a Chevron deferential standard of review?
Two issues are raised by this question: (1) what should trigger a decision
not to apply a Chevron differential standard of review, and (2) what
standard of review should be employed instead?
One alternative is to require judicial review of all agency preemption
decisions. 22 The case study in this article suggests this alternative is not
necessary. Not every agency acts in an overly aggressive manner in
preempting state law so as to always require judicial oversight. The
contrast between the viewpoint of the FDIC and the viewpoint of the OCC
serves as an example. On the other hand, heightened review is necessary
when agency rules or decisions are tainted by agency bias.
Agency bias due to conflict of interests, and the failure of an agency to
act as an impartial tribunal, is an example of the need for judicial
intervention. A federal agency is charged with protecting not only the
interests of the industry it regulates and the interests of the public affected
by its regulations and decisions. It is also charged with protecting the
interests of state governments. This obligation exists because the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly directed federal agencies to preserve
state law to the greatest extent possible unless Congress has explicitly
preempted state law. 123  Indeed this causes the interests of state
governments to be of paramount concern in any preemption determination
by a federal agency. As a result, any agency decision that preempts state
law requires scrutiny. However, as this article has demonstrated, some
agencies, such as the FDIC, have embraced their obligation to protect state
121. E.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1029-32, 1058 (proposing that
Chevron significantly altered the proportion of agency cases affirmed by appellate courts);
Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998) (analyzing three models which
interpret how judges apply the Chevron doctrine).
122. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., OCC v. Spitzer: An Erroneous Application of Chevron
that Should be Reversed, 86 BNA's BANKING REP. No.8 (Feb. 20, 2006) (stating that if the
agency adopts an interpretation of a statute that significantly expands the agency's
jurisdiction or encroaches upon an area traditionally regulated by the states, the reviewing
court should require a clear showing that the agency's interpretation is consistent with the
available evidence of Congressional intent); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption,
102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 798 (2004) (discussing judicial review of agency decisions on state
law preemption questions).
123. This is true for many state laws in the case of the OCC, due to the Court's embrace
of the "significant interference" standard in Barnett. It is especially relevant for state
consumer protection and fair lending statutes due to Congressional intent as documented in
this Article.
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interests. As a result, greater judicial oversight can be limited to cases in
which the agency has failed to embrace that obligation. This would be
evidenced by its reading of preemption power in an overly expansive
manner-a manner at odds with a narrow reading of existing case law or at
odds with the weight of the evidence of legislative intent.
An analogy that can be drawn is that of the judiciary's intervention in
business management decision under the business judgment rule. 2 4 A rule
of deference is similarly recognized in that situation, based on the expertise
of the decision maker and the court's unwillingness to second guess such
expert determinations. However, despite the expertise of the decision
maker the courts do intervene, subjecting decisions to de novo review,
when there is evidence that the decision maker is not acting in the interest
of the group(s) it has a responsibility to serve, including situations in which
its decisions are impaired due to conflicts of interest.125
The second issue is the standard of review to be employed. The goal
is to ensure greater protection of the interests of state governments and
consumers. Commentators have suggested employing the standard of
review found in Skidmore v. Swifi, 1 2 6 which would lead the court to reject
the agency determination if it is "unpersuasive". Commentators have also
suggested a standard of review that is based on the Supreme Court's recent
124. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]
(setting the standards for meeting the directors' duty of care under the business judgment
rule). The analogy to the business judgment rule is not intended to embrace the exact terms
of the rule for purposes of judicial intervention in agency decisions, but only to highlight
judicial willingness to intervene in other contexts in which reluctance to intervene is based
on lack of expertise. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31 (1979) (holding
that responsibility for business judgments must rest with corporate directors since their
individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of this
responsibility).
125. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 124. The business judgment rule places the burden of
proving facts in order to justify judicial intervention on the person challenging the decisions
of management. Id. at § 4.01(d). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment
Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83, 123 & n.232 (2004) (concluding that
rational shareholders would prefer judicial intervention with respect to board decisions that
are tainted; trust of directors is the key due to the self-governing nature of corporate law);
HARRY G. HENN AND JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss
ENTITIES 662 (3d ed., West Pub. Co. 1983) (advocating that business judgment presupposes
an honest, unbiased judgment); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 124 (Aspen Law
& Bus. 1986) (stating that no challenge to the directors' judgments will be considered on the
merits unless the judgment in question was tainted by fraud, conflict of interest, or
illegality).
126. 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (holding that a government agency's interpretation of law will
be respected only to the extent that it is able to persuade). See discussion in Mendelson,
supra note 122, at 797. A comparison of the Chevron standard and the Skidmore standard is
presented in Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L. J.
833, 853-57 (2001).
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decision in Gonzales v. Oregon.127  This approach requires a "clear
showing" that the agency's interpretation is consistent with the available
evidence of Congress' intent. Both are possible alternatives that embrace a
heightened standard of review and would better protect the interests of state
governments and consumers. What is troubling is that both employ vague
standards, i.e. "persuasive" or "clear showing", and therefore permit judges
to embrace agency conclusions with relatively little independent
evaluation. In other words, the heightened judicial review might become
more apparent than real. The interest of state governments and consumers
are so important that, in my view, a standard of review that is most likely to
result in greater recognition of such interests should be embraced. That
standard is de novo review.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explores agency power to preempt state consumer
protection legislation. It presents a case study of preemption based on an
aggressive posture toward non-acquiescence on the part of the Comptroller
of the Currency. The non-acquiescence documented is not only to the
uniform decisions of the circuit courts, but also to the United States
Supreme Court's statements of the law governing conflict preemption in
the field of banking law. The case study also documents agency non-
acquiescence to the stated intent of Congress, whenever available in a
statute's legislative history. This aggressive posture toward non-
acquiescence is a troubling assertion of executive power because of the
lack of effective judicial review. The Article documents that under the
Chevron 28 deferential standard of review, executive power to broadly set
aside state law will not be effectively restrained. The conclusion is that
heightened judicial review is justified at least when an agency exhibits that
it has not acted as an unbiased forum for the claims of affected industry
members, consumers and state governments.
127. 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (striking down an interpretive rule clarifying the Controlled
Substances Act because this power was not within Gonzales' rulemaking power); see also
discussion in Wilmarth, supra note 122.
128. See supra notes 32 and 119.
